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CASE STUDY 
 
Atlantic Yards Community Benefit 
Agreement: A Case Study of Organizing 
Community Support for Development 
NATHAN MARKEY*
I.   INTRODUCTION 
 
Commercial and residential development is occurring at an 
explosive rate in Brooklyn at both the Atlantic Center and the 
Atlantic Terminal.  Now, across the street from these two sites 
developers have proposed a 22-acre, $4.9 billion mixed-use 
development called Atlantic Yards.1  Although the Atlantic Yards 
project has fostered some support through a Community Benefit 
Agreement (CBA), the development has met significant resistance 
and opposition remains.2
This note examines the Atlantic Yards CBA in detail.  The 
first section shows what a CBA is and how community groups can 
induce developers to negotiate.  The second section addresses 
what makes a good CBA: inclusive processes, effective 
negotiation, and that the document is a clear, complete contract.  
Next, CBA analysis is introduced showing how the CBA process 
affects the substantive, procedural and psychological interests of 
the community.
 
3
 
* J.D., Pace Law School, 2010. I would like to thank my parents, Lowell and 
Terry Markey, for their unyielding support and encouragement throughout my 
life and academic career. 
  The third section evaluates the Atlantic Yards 
 1. Atlantic Yards Home Page, http://www.atlanticyards.com/ (now renamed 
the Barclay’s Center) (last visited Oct. 26, 2009). The development will include a 
sports event venue, affordable market-rate housing, commercial offices, retail 
establishments and a boutique hotel along with eight acres of open space. Id. 
 2. Numerous community groups have formed coalitions in opposition of the 
development demanding that the project be more responsive to the community 
as a whole. See, e.g., Develop—Don’t Destroy Brooklyn, http://dddb.net/php/lat 
estnews_ArchiveDate.php (last visited Oct. 26, 2009). 
3.  CBA interest analysis can be viewed in terms of substantive, 
procedural, and psychological interests. 
1
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CBA, the process used to create it, and how the community’s 
interests have been affected. 
II.  WHAT IS A COMMUNITY BENEFIT AGREEMENT?  
A CBA is an enforceable contract negotiated by a developer 
and a coalition of neighborhood groups.4  It is designed to aid 
community members in shaping a project affecting their lives by 
pressing for benefits that meet the community’s needs.5
III.  SUCCESSFUL COMMUNITY BENEFIT      
AGREEEMENTS  
  CBAs, 
are typically negotiated around real estate development, and are 
entered into to secure community benefits in exchange for 
coalition support during the administrative approval process. 
A CBA must be evaluated in broad terms since provisions for 
a successful CBA vary due to individual community circum-
stances.6
 
Substantive interests relate to the content of the decision, (e.g.: does 
the agreement allow for suitable use, is the resource sufficiently 
protected, is the community interest protected).  Procedural interests 
reflect a party’s need to follow the ‘correct procedure.’  For a decision to 
be accepted the process used must be perceived as reasonable and fair.  
An important component of this fairness is the degree to which the 
parties have been involved in the process. Psychological interests 
relate to how parties are treated in the process of making a decision.  If 
a party does not feel adequately involved, treated fairly, and respected 
by others, he/she is less likely to support any decision. 
  But any successful CBA must have an inclusive process 
 
Pace University Land Use Law Center, Land Use Leadership Alliance Training 
Program: Day 3, 6 (2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Pace Law 
School’s Land Use Law Center). 
 4. JULIAN GROSS, GREG LEROY & MADELINE JANIS-APARICIO, COMMUNITY 
BENEFIT AGREEMENTS: MAKING DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS ACCOUNTABLE 9 (2005), 
http://www.communitybenefits.org/downloads/CBA%20Handbook%202005%20fi
nal.pdf; but see BRENDA PARKET, THIS LAND IS OUR LAND: THE BATTLE FOR A 
COMMUNITY BENEFITS AGREEMENT IN MILWAUKEE 1 (May 2005), http://www.labor 
studies.wayne.edu/power/downloads/Parkeast.pdf (discussing how in 2005, a 
CBA supported by twenty-five community groups, was passed by the County 
Board in Milwaukee to be the first CBA implemented through legislation). 
 5. PARKET, supra note 4, at 4. 
 6. Julian Gross, Community Benefit Agreements: Definitions, Values, And 
Legal Enforceability, 17 J. AFFORD. HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 35, 45 (Fall 2007 / 
Winter 2008) (Gross, a leading scholar on CBAs, has created a definition of a 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss1/12
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for forming a community coalition and negotiating agreements, 
which will allow stakeholder interests to be addressed including 
their substantive, procedural and psychological interests.7  When 
conflict exists, the process most often offends; when a community 
feels their voice is not being heard, they believe their procedural 
justice and psychological interests were violated.8
A.   The Process is Inclusive 
  The CBA 
negotiating process needs to be well organized and transparent to 
be effective, with operating rules laid out prior to negotiation so 
that communities can understand the process and feel their 
interests are being addressed.  Finally, the CBA must be a 
complete contract, containing clear, enforceable language, so the 
developer understands exactly how to proceed.  This includes 
remedies in the event of a breach, progress reports, meetings, and 
negotiations to ensure all parties’ expectations are met.  If 
stakeholder interests are addressed, a CBA will ensure 
community interests are protected. 
A planning process that ignores public opinion results in 
controversy regardless of any public benefit.  However, when 
public input is allowed, the result is often well received, if not 
beneficial.9
 
CBA from four elements: 1) “A CBA concerns a single development project;” 2) 
“A CBA is [a] legally enforceable contract;” 3) “A CBA addresses a range of 
community interests;” and 4) “A CBA is the product of substantial community 
involvement”). 
  A CBA negotiation process “provides a mechanism to 
 7. See Land Use Leadership Alliance Training Program, supra note 3, at 
Days 1-2. 
 8. KIRK EMERSON ET AL., THE PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
CONFLICT RESOLUTION 6-9 (Rosemary O’Leary & Lisa Bingham eds., 2003);    
‘Procedural Justice’ offers a theory of procedural fairness for civil 
dispute resolution. The core idea behind the theory is the procedural 
legitimacy thesis: participation rights are essential for the legitimacy 
of adjudicatory procedures. The theory yields two principles of 
procedural justice: the accuracy principle and the participation 
principle. The two principles require a system of procedure to aim at 
accuracy and to afford reasonable rights of participation qualified by a 
practicability constraint.  
Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. Cal. L. Rev. 181, Abstract 
(2004). 
 9. See Land Use Leadership Alliance Training Program, supra note 3, at 
Day 2. 
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ensure that community concerns are heard and addressed.”10  
Community inclusiveness in the development process makes 
CBAs successful.11
When benefits are negotiated in an inclusive CBA, it 
promotes a sense of procedural justice to the community,
 
12 which 
implies that citizen satisfaction with a resolution process is 
directly related to their opportunities to participate. When 
citizens feel they are part of procedural justice, the perceived 
legitimacy of decisions and outcomes increase, thereby decreasing 
the probability of objection13 and minimizing opposition to 
discretionary approval from government entities.  This stands in 
contrast to situations where stakeholders feel a decision was 
forced upon them without the opportunity to be heard.14  
Exclusion from the process makes parties feel the decision may be 
unreasonable, or that they were treated unfairly.15  When 
stakeholders do not feel procedural justice, they oppose the 
decision.16
B.   Effective Community Benefit Agreement 
Negotiation 
 
The first step in pursuing CBA negotiations is to organize a 
broad based coalition of stakeholders with diverse community 
interests, who can formalize their relationship by creating a 
Community Benefits Coalition (CBC).17
 
 10. GROSS, LEROY & JANIS-APARACIO, supra note 4, at 21. 
  This will give the CBA 
an inclusive character and a degree of democratic legitimacy 
 11. Greg LeRoy & Anna Puriton, NEIGHBORHOOD FUNDERS GROUP, COMM-
UNITY BENEFITS AGREEMENTS: ENSURING THAT URBAN REDEVELOPMENT 
BENEFITS EVERYONE 3-4 (2005), http://www.nfg.org/publications/community_ 
benefits_agreements.pdf. 
 12. GROSS, LEROY & JANIS-APARACIO, supra note 4, at 21; Land Use 
Leadership Alliance Training Program, supra note 3, at Day 2. 
 13. EMERSON ET AL., supra note 8, at 8. 
 14. Id. (citing AMY J. DOUGLAS, THE POLITICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL MEDIATION 
(1987)); Land Use Leadership Alliance Training Program, supra note 3, at Days 
1-2. 
 15. Land Use Leadership Alliance Training Program, supra note 3, at Day 3. 
 16. EMERSON ET AL., supra note 8, at 8. 
 17. David A. Marcello, Community Benefit Agreements: New Vehicle for 
Investment in America’s Neighborhoods, 39 URB. LAW. 657, 663-64 (2007). 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss1/12
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compared to typical bi-lateral negotiations between developers 
and government.18
The CBC members should draft a Coalition Operating 
Agreement to establish procedures limiting the negotiation with 
the developer in order to guard against individuals attempting to 
directly benefit from the negotiation.
 
19  Throughout the process 
the CBC should court uninvolved community organizations to 
increase political clout and influence elected officials.20  
Additionally, the CBC should only negotiate benefits that relate 
to the impact of the proposed project.  Incorporating unrelated 
benefits corrupts the zoning review process and taints public 
perception.21
The process of negotiating a CBA should be transparent, so 
the entire community can understand the developer’s specific 
commitments and monitor the development project’s outcome.
 
22  
The Coalition must represent the views of the community as a 
whole to ensure an inclusive public process.  If stakeholders are 
excluded from knowledge about a process, it may be perceived as 
unreasonable and unfair when that same process later affects 
them.23
 
 18. Id. at 664. 
 
 19. See Memorandum from David Marcello, The Public Law Center, A 
“Concentric Circles” Model For Organizing Community Benefit Agreements (Mar. 
15, 2007), available at http://www.law.tulane.edu/WorkArea/downloadasse 
t.aspx?id=5746&LangType=1033 (executable pdf) (discussing of the role of the 
CBC, along with the steps and procedures that that a CBC should take for 
negotiations to be effective upon reaching the negotiating table). For a model 
Operating Agreement see Tulane University Law School, The Public Law 
Center, Services to the Community, http://www.law.tulane.edu/tlscenters/Public 
LawCenter/home.aspx?id =3906 (last visited Oct. 26, 2009). 
 20. See id. 
 21. In an influential 1988 report, the New York City Bar Association said 
some politicians had approved projects solely to get unrelated benefits, thereby 
corrupting the zoning process. The lawyers’ group recommended that any ame-
nities promised by a developer have a reasonable relationship to the project, a 
practice that successive administrations adopted said Jesse Masyr, the lawyer 
who negotiated the Bronx Terminal agreement. See Terry Pristin, In Major 
Projects, Agreeing Not to Disagree, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2006, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/14/realestate/commercial /14agree.html. 
 22. GROSS, LEROY & JANIS-APARACIO, supra note 4, at 22. 
 23. See Land Use Leadership Alliance Training Program, supra note 3, at 
Days 1-2. 
5
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C.   The Agreement is Clear and Complete 
CBAs are contracts and must meet the basic elements of a 
contract to be an effective tool.  Opponents of CBAs often criticize 
them for lapses in enforceability, not providing adequate modes of 
revision or negotiation, a lack of consideration by the community 
coalition, or clear outcomes to the contract.24  Enforceability is 
critical if a CBA is to be an effective tool for providing benefits to 
the community.  The CBA must provide clear terms describing 
provisions for enforcement, remedies available to the parties, as 
well as the forum in which parties may seek enforcement.  Since 
a community coalition could dissolve and render the CBA 
unenforceable, incorporating the government is essential to 
ensuring that provisions can be imposed in perpetuity.25
Often, when the government negotiates a Development 
Agreement for community benefits, the agreements are couched 
in vague terms with non-binding goals and aspirations, as 
opposed to “enforceable language used on traditional land use 
issues like project design, infrastructure . . . and financing 
requirements.”
 
26
A complete CBA should provide adequate modes for review 
and revision.  Most major development projects require contin-
uing oversight since the project will immediately impact the  
  The CBA should use legally binding terms, 
thereby assuring that all parties will be accountable for the 
provisions in the agreement. 
 
 24. Patricia E. Salkin, Understanding Community Benefit Agreements: Opp-
ortunities And Traps For Developers, Municipalities and Community Organiza-
tions, American Law Institute—American Bar Association for Continuing Legal 
Education, Course of Study, SN005 ALI-ABA 1407, 1424-26 (Aug. 16-18, 2007).  
The author notes that the “enforceability of CBAs has yet to be tested in court, 
but that some lawyers have expressed concerns that the agreements will not 
hold up.” Id. at 1424.  The primary concern has been whether community groups 
provide any consideration for these contracts; however promises to not oppose 
developments are likely to be deemed supported by consideration. 17 AM. JUR. 
2D Contracts § 124 (1964). In contract law, only signatories are able to enforce 
provisions; CBAs have been encouraged to require that each community group 
sign the CBA separately. Salkin, at 1424. For a more in-depth discussion of legal 
issues related to CBA, see Salkin, at 1424-26. 
 25. Patricia E. Salkin & Amy Lavine, Understanding Community Benefits 
Agreements: Equitable Development, Social Justice and Other Considerations for 
Developers, Municipalities and Community Organizations, 26 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. 
& POL’Y 291, 295 (2008). 
 26. Gross, supra note 6, at 39. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss1/12
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community while benefits may not be realized for years to come.  
To avoid this, CBAs should include provisions for continued 
review and monitoring of developers’ progress.  Further, while 
negotiations should attempt to capture all of the parties’ 
concerns, as the development progresses, the terms may need to 
be modified to accommodate all parties.  So, the CBA should have 
flexible provisions allowing for negotiation and change. 
IV.   ATLANTIC YARDS  
Atlantic Yards will be a multi-purpose development project 
that will collect over $300 million in subsidies from New York 
City and State, and will receive property and sales tax 
exemptions along with property transfers.27  Some have 
estimated that the project will receive $2,157,260,000 in subsidies 
and tax breaks.28
A.   Atlantic Yards CBA 
  This fiscal promise provides community groups 
with substantial leverage in negotiating benefits in exchange for 
support during the approval process. 
Developer Bruce Ratner announced his intention to build the 
Atlantic Yards Arena on December 10, 2003.29  However, not 
until January 23, 2004 did it become certain that the Atlantic 
Yards project would move forward.30  Then, in July 2004, the 
developer held a meeting of potential CBA signatories31
 
 27. Charles V. Bagli, Brooklyn Arena Builder Plans to Break Ground In 
December After Delay, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2008, available at http://www.ny 
times.com/2008/09/10/nyregion/10yards.html. 
 
including: the New York Chapter for the Association of 
 28. Calder, Rich, Your ‘Net’ Loss: $2B In Taxes to Ratner, NEW YORK POST 
(Apr. 14, 2008), available at http://www.nypost.com/p/news/regional/your_net_ 
loss_Qz1qBFFuTuAysV3Be1rEOJ. 
 29. Charles V. Bagli, A Grand Plan in Brooklyn For the Nets’ Arena Complex, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2003, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/ 
12/11/nyregion/a-grand-plan-in-brooklyn-for-the-nets-arena-complex.html. 
 30. Richard Sandomir & Charles V. Bagli, Ratner’s Path to Buy Nets Had 
Pitfalls and Promise, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2004, available at http://www.nytimes 
.com/2004/01/25/sports/pro-basketball-ratner-s-path-to-buy-nets-had-pitfallsand-
promise.html. 
 31. PRATT INST. CTR. FOR COMMUNITY & ENVTL. DEV., SLAM DUNK OR AIRBALL? 
A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF ATLANTIC YARDS PROJECT 14 (2005). 
7
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Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN), a 
membership-based group representing low-income city residents; 
Brooklyn United for Innovative Local Development (BUILD), a 
local group sponsored by Assembly member Roger Green; and the 
Downtown Brooklyn Oversight and Advisory Committee 
(DBOAC), which focuses on contracts for minorities and women.32  
The final CBA was signed June 27, 2005, resulting in seven 
distinct agreed upon categories of benefits33
B.   Atlantic Yards CBA Process 
 including: Jobs 
Development; Small Business Development and Contracting, 
Housing; Community Amenities and Facilities; Environmental 
Assurances; and Public Housing, and Educational Initiatives.  
These seven areas encompass a broad range of values and 
benefits for the community beyond those typically provided 
without a CBA.  Despite this, the development still faces large 
opposition. 
i.   Is the Process Inclusive? 
Early on it was apparent that the developer desired a CBA to 
gain public support.34  BUILD moved to negotiate a CBA, 
presenting a draft on April 24, 2004, three months after it was 
certain the project was moving forward.35
 
 32. See id. 
  Madeline Janis-
Aparicio, executive director of the Los Angeles Alliance for a New 
Economy, stated it should take up to a year to bring together a 
coalition before beginning negotiations, and that successful CBAs 
 33. See Atlantic Yards Community Benefit Agreement (June 2005) (on file 
with author); See also Atlantic Yards, The Community Benefits Agreement at a 
Glance, (2005) (on file with author) (providing a brief summation of the major 
points of each community benefit area negotiated). 
 34. See Bettina Damiani, Comments at the Public Hearing of the New York 
City Council Committee on Economic Development on the Proposed Atlantic 
Yards Project (May 26, 2005), available at http://www.goodjobsny.org/testim 
ony_bay_5_05.htm. Bettina Damiani, Project Director at Good Jobs New York, 
which promotes accountability in the use of economic development subsidies, 
states that this is “the first project [Good Jobs New York] know[s] of in New 
York City in which the developer has advertised that he seeks to participate in a 
[CBA].” Id. 
 35. Brooklyn United for Innovative Local Development (BUILD), Facts & 
Myths, http://www.buildbrooklyn.org/index.php?sect_id=fact (last visited Oct. 
26, 2009). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss1/12
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don’t skip steps and still form broad, complete community 
coalitions.36
Here, a single entity attempted to negotiate a CBA without 
taking the time required to create a representative coalition.   
Bettina Damiani, project director of Good Job New York, stated 
that the most striking difference between the proposed Atlantic 
Yards CBA and the CBAs in California is that the Atlantic Yards 
CBA lacked a broad coalition representing varied interests.  In 
the Atlantic Yards CBA a few groups—all already publicly 
supporting the project—pursued individual concerns rather than 
including the community as a whole in a comprehensive 
negotiation.
 
37  “While certainly a win in the fight for affordable 
housing,” the chance for an inclusive coalition, representing all 
parties, was reduced.38
Damiani stated that CBAs normally include a broad coalition 
representing a variety of interests that might oppose a project.
 
39  
As described by Damiani typically “the coalition hammers out its 
points of unity in advance,”40 in a Coalition Operating 
Agreement.  Then, during negotiations, individual group issues 
proceed as unmet until all member issues are addressed.41
The groups that signed the Atlantic Yards CBA did not form 
a broad coalition representing the entire community.
  This 
way the bargaining power of each benefits the coalition as a 
whole. 
42
 
 36. Terry Pristin, In Major Projects, Agreeing Not to Disagree, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 14, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/14/realestate/comer 
cial/14agree.html?pagewanted=1. 
  By 
 37. See Damiani, supra note 34. It should be noted, counter to many stat-
ements by opposition parties, that when the negotiations took place, all parties 
met together, according to BUILD President James Caldwell in a phone 
interview. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. See also Marcello, Community Benefit Agreements, supra, note 17, at 
663-64; Marcello, “Concentric Circles,” supra note 19. 
 42. The President of BUILD stated during a phone interview that other 
community groups were invited to the negotiations by the President of 
Brooklyn’s Office prior to the beginning of the negotiations who turned down the 
invitations, but neither Mr. Caldwell nor the President’s Office were able to 
name any parties invited nor provide documentation of the invitations to the 
other groups. It should be noted that eventually, two months into negotiations, 
another group was invited to join the negotiations by the developer only after 
9
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excluding others from negotiation, the signatories defeated the 
fundamental purpose of the CBA—to garner public support.  
Instead, an alternative coalition was formed including three 
elected officials from the project’s proposed location.43  While also 
supporting development, this coalition had different goals than 
the CBA signatories.  By being left out of the process, this group’s 
sense of procedural justice was breached, creating strong 
opposition to the development, in spite of the beneficial provisions 
negotiated by the signatories.44
Opposition to the Agreement stated that the public was 
unaware of negotiations until the story broke on October 2, 2004, 
two months after negotiation started and an analyst from Good 
Jobs New York expressed concern over the lack of transparency.
 
45
 
drawing attention to itself. However this invitation was eventually turned down.  
See Jess Wisloski, Ratner invites chosen few to draft agreement, THE BROOKLYN 
PAPER, Oct. 2, 2004, available at http://www.brooklynpaper.com/stories/27/38/ 
27_38nets2.html; Brooklyn United for Innovative Local Development (BUILD), 
Facts & Myths, http://www.buildbrooklyn.org/index.php?sect_id=fact (last 
visited Oct. 26, 2009); but see Brian J. Carreira, Ratner Applies Full-Court Press 
on Downtown Arena, THE BROOKLYN RAIL, Nov. 2004, available at 
http://www.brooklynrail.org/%202004/11/local/ratner-applies-full-court-press-on-
the-d (last visited Oct. 23, 2009). Discussing how, 
  
Prior to the newspaper article, the negotiators made no public 
 
[a]t the October 26 BUILD meeting in Crown Heights, however, there 
was a distinctly different interpretation of both the overall proposal as 
well as the CBA negotiations. Marie Louis, the 1st Vice President of the 
group, described the PICCED survey as ‘skewed’ and said that the 
assertion that local residents weren’t being engaged in the CBA process 
is ‘laughable.’  
Id.  
 43. Develop—Don’t Destroy Brooklyn, Community Based Plans, Community 
Design Principles, http://dddb.net/php/community/principles.php (last visited 
Oct. 26, 2009).  The alternative coalition has created an agreement of values and 
benefits that they would negotiate for together, as recommended by both 
Damiani and Marcello. Additionally, the alternative coalition has created a 
development and found the support of a developer, Extell, who eventually bid 
more for the Vanderbilt Yards property than Ratner, but MTA choose to go with 
the lower bid. See also Develop—Don’t Destroy Brooklyn, Community Based 
Plans, The UNITY Community Development Plan, http://dddb.net/php/commun 
ity/unity.php (last visited Oct. 26, 2009). 
 44. See Land Use Leadership Alliance Training Program, supra note 3, at  
Day 1, 2. 
 45. Jess Wisloski, Who will benefit from arena CBA, THE BROOKLYN PAPER, 
Oct. 16, 2004, available at http://brooklynpaper.com/stories/27/40/27_40nets4. 
html. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss1/12
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statements.  A Community Board district manager stated 
“[o]ngoing negotiations are not something typically done in the 
public forum,” against typical principles of a successful CBA. 46
While BUILD President, James Caldwell, stated that the 
meetings were open to the public, and that BUILD held weekly 
meetings to inform its own members about Atlantic Yards and 
the CBA process,
 
47 the public felt the process was hidden.48  
Nearly a full year after the CBA was signed, on June 13, 2006, 
the coalition began to hold “meet & greet” sessions, open forums 
for the coalition to inform the community about the benefits of 
the Agreement.49
ii.   Benefits Not Reflective of Community Needs and 
Concerns 
  While these meetings represented a step 
toward increasing transparency in the CBA process, it came too 
late.  With the document already signed, the community had 
already been left out. 
Besides the exclusionary, opaque process, community 
stakeholders are often concerned that, while the CBA provisions 
are beneficial, they do not address the actual concerns of the 
community.50  The Pratt Institute conducted a survey of residents 
and businesses in the vicinity of the Atlantic Yards and found 
they have major concerns about housing, traffic, and the project’s 
potential impact on neighborhood schools and public safety.51  
For the many residents who are not directly facing these issues, 
the promise of jobs and affordable housing outweighs the 
neighbor-hood concerns of those residents of Prospect Heights 
and downtown Brooklyn.52
 
 46. Wisloski, supra note 42. 
  The Pratt survey found that residents 
 47. Telephone Interview with James Caldwell, President, BUILD (Feb. 6, 
2009); see also Carreira, supra note 42. 
 48. See, e.g., Wisloski, supra note 42. 
 49. Posting of Norman Oder, CBA coalition launches invite-only “Meet & 
Greet” session, to Atlantic Yards Report Watchdog Blog (June 23, 2006, 7:27 
AM), http://atlanticyardsreport.blogspot.com/2006/06/cba-coalition-launchesinvit 
e-only.html. 
 50. PRATT INST. CTR., supra note 31, at 56. 
 51. Id. at 2, 24. The survey was of some 20,000 people near downtown 
Brooklyn, between June and September 2004, about six to nine months after the 
announcement of the project. Id. at 24. 
 52. Id. at 24. 
11
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support development in the neighborhood, but they want future 
development to address neighborhood shortcomings and provide 
opportunity for the low-income populations in Brooklyn.53
The CBA negotiated between the developer and the limited 
community groups addresses most of the primary concerns found 
by Pratt in its survey of local residents, except for traffic safety 
and street conditions, which were marginally addressed during 
the environmental review process.
 
54  Section IV of the CBA is 
named “Workforce Development” and “its purpose is to 
implement workforce development initiatives addressing the 
problem of disproportionately high unemployment within the 
Community.”55  The CBA includes provisions for hiring and 
training community minorities for skilled jobs while also helping 
local small business development.56  The CBA addresses 
affordable housing, housing for senior citizens, and makes 
provisions for displaced families by providing leases in the new 
buildings at the same cost as their prior residences.57  
Community concern over the lack of quality educational facilities, 
were also addressed, with the promise of adding four schools with 
specific curricular concentrations and after school programs.58 In 
addition, the CBA addresses other concerns such as the need for 
an affordable health care center, childcare centers, community 
youth and senior centers, as well as environmental assurances, 
and open space.59  Issues not significantly focused on include 
traffic and parking issues, eminent domain, displacement of 
residents and businesses, increased real estate prices, impact on 
public transportation, and the effect that the scale of the 
development will have on the community character.60
 
 53. Id. 
  While the 
CBA does address numerous community concerns, these 
unanswered issues demonstrate the necessity for a broader 
 54. See Atlantic Yards, Community Benefit Agreement, supra note 33; PRATT 
INST. CTR., supra note 31, at 24. 
 55. Atlantic Yards, Community Benefit Agreement, supra note 33, at 11. 
 56. Id. at 11-22, 37; see also The Community Benefits Agreement at a Glance, 
supra note 33, at 1. 
 57. Atlantic Yards, Community Benefit Agreement, supra note 33, at 22–25. 
 58. Id. at 38-41. 
 59. See generally id. 
 60. PRATT INST. CTR., supra note 31, at 24. 
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coalition that will ensure that more of the community’s concerns 
are heard. 
iii.  Atlantic Yards CBA is Clear and Complete 
As stated, a CBA is a contract and must meet the elements of 
a contract.  It must provide the proper mechanisms for 
community groups to enforce its provisions and provide clear 
terms as to how the provisions will be enforced.  The Atlantic 
Yards CBA has clear terms throughout the agreement and 
finalizes those terms with an enforcement section for when the 
parties need to mediate disagreements.61
Some opponents criticize the enforcement provisions of the 
Agreement as being too lax, since it opts for arbitration and 
mediation before monetary penalties or litigation.
 
62  But 
opponents forget that a CBA is used to collaborate toward a 
beneficial outcome for all, and that enforcement provisions that 
advocate continued harmony rather than an adversarial attitude 
reflect a well thought out Agreement.  Some CBAs, including the 
California Models, have similarly vague enforcement sections,63 
reinforcing the idea that encouraging collaboration is one sign of 
a thorough CBA.  Additionally, mediation and arbitration allow 
for modification and change during the development process—a 
key feature as large developments often take years and have 
unforeseeable impacts.  Allowing space for both parties to modify 
provisions of the agreement as circumstances change is sound 
reasoning.64
While not a requirement of a successful CBA, having the 
government serve as a signatory of the agreement ensures 
enforceability of the provisions if the community groups dissolve.  
 The Atlantic Yards CBA provisions allowing 
modification, change and collaboration to solve disputes are signs 
of a successful CBA negotiation; a document that will allow 
continued collaboration toward a mutually beneficial end under 
any circumstance. 
 
 61. Atlantic Yards, Community Benefit Agreement, supra note 33, at 46. 
 62. Posting of Norman Oder, “Substantial legally enforceable penalties?” 
FCR’s claims about CBA raise doubts, to Atlantic Yards Report Watchdog Blog 
(Feb. 19, 2008, 6:04 AM),  http://atlanticyardsreport.blogspot.com/2008/02/subst 
antial-legally-enforceable. html. 
 63. Id. 
 64. See generally id. 
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This is particularly helpful in a CBA of this nature where there 
are limited community groups and provisions that may be 
enforced by only one side. 
C.   Analysis 
The Atlantic Yards CBA illustrates how, when parties feel 
they are denied procedural justice, their perception of a decision 
or an outcome’s legitimacy will decrease; which will subsequently 
increases the probability that the community will object to that 
same decision or outcome during the approval process.65  Many 
community residents felt the CBA’s formation and negotiation 
processes were neither reasonable nor correct, that participants 
were not treated fairly, and that the process infringed upon the 
communities’ procedural and psychological interests.66  While the 
CBA does provides numerous benefits, including affordable 
housing and union jobs, the coalition failed to address other 
community concerns such as traffic, parking, and the forced re-
location of residents.67
In addition, the coalition abandoned the California CBA 
model and rejected much of the academic literature.
  The process that was used violated the 
community’s three categories of interests, and instead fueled 
parties’ opposition to the development. 
68  Instead of 
acting in unison, the group employed a piecemeal approach 
driven by individual demands and used a memorandum of 
understanding that led to the final document.69
 
 65. EMERSON ET AL., supra note 8, at 8; see generally Develop—Don’t Destroy 
Brooklyn, The Opposition, http://dddb.net/php/opposition.php (last visited Oct. 
26, 2009). 
  As an alter-
native, the group should have recruited from the general public to 
form a representational, or broader community base rather than 
letting the developer individually approach specific stakeholders 
and negotiate the agreement behind closed doors.  Had an 
alternative process been used it could have created an inclusive 
 66. See Damiani, supra note 34; Land Use Leadership Alliance Training 
Program, supra note 3, at Days 1-2. 
 67. PRATT INST. CTR., supra note 31, at 24. 
 68. See LeRoy & Puriton, supra note 11, at 6-9; Marcello, Community Benefit 
Agreements, supra note 17, at 663-64. 
 69. Atlantic Yards Related Documents, Atlantic Yards, http://www.atlantic 
yards.com/html/footer/documents.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2009). 
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process, increasing the publicly perceived legitimacy of process.70  
Additionally, the coalition should have composed an Operating 
Agreement limiting parties from negotiating individually, thereby 
creating greater unity.  When released to the public, an 
Operating Agreement would have increased transparency and 
informed the community about the goals and purposes of the 
negotiations.71
While the process that created the CBA was flawed, the final 
document itself was clear and complete, allowing for ongoing 
negotiations, modifications, and/or collaborations between the 
parties.  The Atlantic Yards CBA provides numerous benefits, 
such as affordable housing, open space, union jobs, and 
environmental assurances, reflecting residents’ concerns and 
needs.
 
72
V.   CONCLUSION 
   However, these benefits were tainted in the public’s eye 
due to a lack of transparency. 
The Atlantic Yards CBA provides many helpful provisions 
that advance community interests.  As a document, it provides for 
review and revision as the development progresses, and includes 
provisions so that community groups can enforce their respective 
conditions. However, the exclusive process negated broader 
community involvement and created a palpable sense of 
procedural injustice.73
Large developments change the landscape of any given 
community, even one as developed and urbanized as Brooklyn.  
They impact daily life both positively by providing new resources 
and assets, and negatively by further burdening public 
infrastructure, including schools and roads.  These potential 
impacts of large develop projects typically result in a polarized 
debate, much like the Atlantic Yards controversy.  However, 
where developers employ an inclusive CBA process that allows 
 
 
 70. See Marcello, Community Benefit Agreements, supra note 17, at 663-64. 
 71. See Marcello, “Concentric Circles,” supra note 19. 
 72. See Atlantic Yards, Community Benefit Agreement, supra note 33. 
 73. PRATT INST. CTR., supra note 31, at 24 (stating that “an overwhelming 
majority (81.4%) of survey respondents said they were either very concerned or 
concerned about the impact of the proposed Brooklyn Atlantic Yards Project”). 
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broad community involvement, it can dissipate much of the 
neighborhood opposition. 
When a CBA process is inclusive it allows for a sense of 
procedural justice and creates a process that can address the 
interests of the community.74  When a stakeholder is given the 
opportunity to participate in the decision-making process, his or 
her procedural interests are met,75 and a sense of inclusion 
satisfies the community’s psychological interests.76  Intuitively, 
when a party is given an opportunity to be heard, it is more likely 
that the process will address their substantive interests.77  When 
a person’s procedural interests are satisfied and he or she is given 
a sense of procedural justice, the probability that the citizen will 
object to the development during the approval process is 
decreased.78
The Atlantic Yards CBA provides for numerous potential 
benefits that would not otherwise be provided to the community 
from a typical development.  However, the process in which the 
coalition was formed and operated lacked the necessary 
transparency to create an inclusive group and to give the public 
assurances that their concerns about the development and the 
needs of the community were being addressed by the coalition.  
Future CBA coalitions can look to the Atlantic Yards as a model 
for potential benefits and how to draft a clear and complete 
contract, but should avoid the many early pitfalls of failing to 
create an inclusive CBA.  The potential Columbia CBA in 
Manhattan is already taking note to avoid the errors of the 
 In summation, when a person’s three interests, 
procedural, psychological and substantive are addressed, it will 
likely decrease the conflict surrounding a development.  Even in 
situations where the ultimate decision may go against the 
stakeholder’s substantive interest, if that person’s procedural 
interest is met, he or she may feel that the ultimate goal was still 
achieved—the community interest was protected by its 
involvement in an inclusive CBA. 
 
 74. See Land Use Leadership Alliance Training Program, supra note 3, at 
Days 1-2. 
 75. See id. 
 76. See id. 
 77. See id. 
 78. EMERSON ET AL., supra note 8, at 8. 
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Atlantic Yards CBA by seeking a wider coalition and allow 
greater public review of the process.79
 
 79. Posting of Norman Order, CBAs head to head: Columbia vs. Atlantic 
Yards, Atlantic Yards Report Watchdog Blog (Aug. 22, 2007, 6:25 AM), 
http://atlanticyardsreport.blogspot.com/2007/08/cbas-head-to-head-columbia-vs-
atlantic.html. 
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